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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

CATRINA MARIE OTTESEN,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No.

950425-CA

Priority No.

2

:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JVRIgPICTIQN AND NATTJEE QF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a conviction for possession of a
controlled substance with intent to distribute in a drug free
zone, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§ 58-37-8(1) (a) (iv) (Supp. 1995), in the Fourth Judicial District
Court, in and for Utah County, State of Utah, the Honorable Boyd
C. Park, presiding.

This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah

Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1995).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Did the trial court properly conclude that defendant was

reasonably detained in a traffic stop.

*[T]he trial court's

final determination concerning lawfulness of a detention or
search is reviewed for correctness.
656, 659 (Utah App. 1993).

State v. White. 856 P.2d

The trial court's ruling should not,

however, be subjected to ua close de novo review."
Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 939 (Utah 1994).

State v.

Rather, some deference is

accorded the trial court because the reasonable suspicion
standard itself "conveys a measure of discretion to the trial
judge[s]" so that they can "grapple with the multitude of fact
patterns that may constitute a reasonable-suspicion
determination."

J&. at 939-40.

In contrast, the trial court's

findings of purely factual issues that underlie its reasonable
suspicion determination, such as witness credibility and
historical facts, are subject to reversal only if clearly
erroneous.

Id. at 93 9 n.4.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULE?
The following constitutional provisions, statutes and rules
pertinent to this issues on appeal are fully set out Addendum A:
Amendment
Utah Code
Utah Code
Utah Code

4, United States Constitution;
Ann. § 32a-12-209 (1994);
Ann. § 41-4-44.4 (1993);
Ann. § 77-7-15 (1995).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Defendant, Catrina Marie Ottesen, was charged with
possession of marijuana, a controlled substance, with intent to
distribute in a drug free zone (Count I), illegal drug tax, a
third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 59-19103(1) (b) (1992) (Count II), unlawful possession or use of drug
paraphernalia in a drug free zone, a class A misdemeanor, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 38-37a-5(l) (1994) (Count III), and
illegal possession of alcohol, a class B misdemeanor, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 32a-12-209 (1994) (Count IV) (R.
16-17).

Defendant entered into a conditional plea, preserving

the right to appeal the denial of her motion to suppress
evidence, and pleaded guilty to possession of a controlled
substance with intent to distribute in a drug free zone in a drug
free zone (R. 93-94) . The other counts were dismissed (R. 93) .
The trial court sentenced defendant to a suspended term of oneto-fifteen years in the Utah State Prison, placing defendant on
probation for thirty-six months upon certain terms and conditions
(R. 95-96) .
2

STATEMENT QF TCT FACT?
On January 6, 1994, Orem City Police Officer Gary McGiven
was patrolling in an unmarked car when a rapidly traveling car
pulled to within a car length behind him and continued following
at this distance for a couple of blocks (R. 129-30) . After
allowing the car to pass, Officer Mcgiven pulled behind the car
and turned on his red and blue visor lights in order to stop it
for traveling at an unsafe distance (R, 46-47, 130-31).
The car pulled over and the driver and passenger/owner-ofthe-car, identified themselves to the officer as Dameon
Littlefield and Catrina Ottesen, respectively (R. 29 n.2, 13132).

While asking for the driver's identification, Officer

McGiven smelled alcohol on Littlefield's breath (R. 132).
Discovering also that Littlefield was under twenty-one years of
age, the officer ran a license and warrants check on Littlefield
and found that there was an outstanding warrant for a speeding
violation (R. 133). Officer McGiven advised Littlefield of the
outstanding warrant and asked him to get out of the car (R. 133) .
When Littlefield exited, the officer smelled the alcohol more
strongly and noticed that Littlefield's eyes appeared to be
glazed, his pupils constricted and his speech "slow and thick"
(R. 133, 140). At this point Officer McGiven called for backup
from the Alcohol Enforcement Officer, Wayne Fish (R. 133, 140).
Approximately fifteen minutes had passed since the initial stop
(R. 140).
Officer Fish, who was only eight blocks away, appeared on
the scene in about five or ten minutes (R. 134, 161). He also
smelled alcohol on Littlefield and conducted a field sobriety
test.

The horizontal gaze nystagmus test, plus the odor of
3

alcohol indicated the presence of alcohol, later confirmed by
blood alcohol tests (R. 168-70).
Either while Officer Fish was conducting the field sobriety
tests or just after, Officer McGiven turned his attention to
defendant (R. 156, 159). Her physical appearance and
identification indicated that she also was under age (R. 142-43) .
Suspecting the presence of alcohol, the officer asked her if
there was any alcohol in the car (R. 141, 144). In response,
defendant reached down to the floorboard, retrieved five unopened
bottles of beer and handed them to Officer McGiven (R. 144-45) •
Following some discussion about how the situation should be
handled (R. 145), Officer McGiven, knowing that he could
legitimately search the car incident to Littlefield's arrest on
either the outstanding warrant or for a probable violation of the
"not a drop" law1 (R. 147-48), approached defendant with her
various options, to wit:

defendant could consent to a search of

the car, in which case the officer would issue her a citation for
a minor in possession of alcohol, or he would arrest her and
search the car without her consent (R. 148-49).2
Defendant refused to consent to a search (R. 149). She was
1

Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.4 (1993) provides: nA person
younger than 21 years of age may not operate or be in actual
physical control of a vehicle with any measurable blood, breath,
or urine alcohol concentration in his body as shown by a chemical
test."
2

While the options presented to defendant appear to have
the tone of an ultimatum, the circumstances tend to confirm
Officer McGiven's view that, "No, I didn't put it like that at
all" (R. 149). As noted, Officer McGiven knew that he could
search the car regardless of defendant's consent (R. 147). In
asking for defendant's consent without arresting her, when he
intended to search the car anyway, he explained that he was just
being a "nice guy" (R. 147).
4

then arrested for being a minor in possession of alcohol (R.
150).

Incident to that arrest, the officers first searched

defendant's coat and found rolling papers in the pocket (R. 163).
Thereafter, they found in the car baggies of marijuana and a
large amount of marijuana in a gym bag (R. 163-65).

S9MMAEY QF AROTMgNT
POINT I
Defendant's multiple attacks on the reasonableness of her
initial detention and its expanded scope fail for lack of factual
and legal support.

Defendant, a minor and owner and passenger in

her car, does not challenge the initial stop of the car for
following an unmarked patrol car at an unsafe distance.

The

developing events thereafter justified her continued detention
for investigation and consequent arrest for being a minor in
possession of alcohol, and for the search of the car, which
uncovered controlled substances resulting in defendant's arrest
for drug related offenses.
Contrary to defendant's assertions, the record supports the
trial court's findings that the driver of the car did not have a
valid driver's license and that the driver, a minor, showed signs
of intoxication.

Even if these findings were clearly erroneous,

it would not effect the trial court's ultimate conclusion that
defendant was justifiably detained.

The car was legitimately

stopped for a moving violation during which time the officer
properly checked the driver's license and simultaneously checked
for warrants.

Not only did the driver have an outstanding

warrant, but his breath also smelled of alcohol, giving the
officer probable cause to arrest him for violating the "not a
drop" law.

5

Utah's appellate courts have repeatedly stated that a police
officer may conduct a warrants check in the course of a routine
traffic stop, as long as the added detention is not unduly
prolonged.

Further, there is no bright-line rule on the time

period within which an investigative detention must be performed,
as long as the police officer diligently pursues the
investigation to either confirm or dispel his suspicions.

In

this case the record indicates that the license and warrants
checks were conducted simultaneously and that defendant was
detained only fifteen minutes before the officer, alone with two
suspects, requested backup to investigate the driver's apparent
intoxication.

Further, because the officer was justified in

stopping the car and extending the detention to investigate the
driver, defendant's extended detention was justified.

Finally,

defendant was justifiably detained in her own right because the
investigating officer had a reasonable, articulable suspicion
that she, the owner of the car, was a minor in possession of
alcohol based on her companion's evidently having recently
consumed alcohol.

POINT I
DEFENDANT WAS JUSTIFIABLY DETAINED AND HER
CAR WAS JUSTIFIABLY SEARCHED INCIDENT TO BOTH
HER AND THE DRIVER'S ARRESTS
Defendant argues, in substance, that following the traffic
stop, she was unjustifiably detained while Officer McGiven did a
license and warrants check on Littlefield, the driver, and
thereafter for fifteen minutes, an unreasonable period of time,
while Officer McGiven requested backup to assess Littlefield's

6

supposed intoxication.

Appellant's Br. at 7.

She further argues

that because Officer McGiven smelled neither marijuana or alcohol
on her, nor had any indication that defendant had violated the
law, there was no reasonable justification to detain her at all,
much less ask her about the presence of alcohol in the car.
Appellant's Br. at 7, 10.
Defendant does not dispute that the initial stop of the car
for following at an unsafe distance was justified.

See State v.

Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1132, (Utah 1994) (a police officer may
legally stop a vehicle for a traffic violation).

The State does

not dispute, for the purposes of this appeal, that defendant was
detained when the car was initially stopped,3 but argues that the
scope of her detention was justified by the circumstances that
rendered the initial stop permissible in the first place.

See

State v. Hiaains, 884 P.2d 1242, 1244 (Utah 1994) (stating that
an automobile passenger's seizure "arguably continued during the
trip back to the [scene of the theft] but was not unreasonable
because the officers were entirely justified in stopping the
car").

In fact, the record confirms that the officers had

reasonable justification at every stage of the stop to further
detain defendant and her companion while investigating offenses
related to motor vehicles and alcoholic beverages.

3

The motion to suppress hearing was conducted with the
apparent understanding that defendant was seized when the car was
stopped. This assumption, however, is not compelled. In State
v. Hiaains, the defendant was a passenger in a car stopped
because the driver had left a gasoline station without paying.
State v. Hiaains, 884 P.2d 1242, 1243 (Utah 1994). The court
assumed, but refused to hold, that the automobile passenger was
seized by the initial stop of the car. Id. at 1244.
7

A.

Tfcefcfrwconceding Scops Qf Pet$frtiQii

"'What the Constitution forbids is not all searches and
seizures, but unreasonable searches and seizures.'" Terry v.
Ohio. 392 U.S. 1, 9, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1873 (1968) (quoting Elkins
v. United States. 364 U.S. 206, 222, 80 S. Ct. 1437, 1446-47
(1960) ) . "To determine whether a search or seizure is
constitutionally reasonable, we make a dual inquiry: (1) Was the
police officer's action "justified at its inception'? And (2) Was
the resulting detention 'reasonably related in scope to the
circumstances that justified the interference in the first
place'?"

Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1132 (quoting Terry at 19-20, 88 S.

Ct. at 1879).
In Lopez, the court set out in full the considerations used
to determine whether the scope of the police officer's
investigation lay within constitutional limitations:
Once a traffic stop is made, the detention
"must be temporary and last no longer than is
necessary to effectuate the purpose of the
stop." Florid vT Rcyer, 460 u.s. 491, 500,
103 S. Ct. 1319, 1325 (1983). Both the
"length and [the] scope of the detention must
be 'strictly tied to and justified by' the
circumstances which rendered its initiation
permissible." State vT JohnSQri/ 805 P. 2d
761, 763 (Utah 1991) (quoting Terry. 392 U.S.
at 19-20, 88 S. Ct. at 1878). . . .
Investigative questioning that further
detains the driver must be supported by
reasonable suspicion of more serious criminal
activity. Reasonable suspicion means
suspicion based oh specific, articulable
facts drawn from the totality of the
circumstances facing the officer at the time
of the stop. £££ State v. Mendoza. 748 P.2d
181, 183 (Utah 1987); State v, Mynsen, 821
P.2d 13, 15 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); TState v.1
Robinson. 797 P.2d [431], 435 [(Utah App.
1990)]. If reasonable suspicion of more
serious criminal activity does arise, the
scope of the stop is still limited. The

8

officers must "'diligently [pursue] a means
of investigation that [is] likely to confirm
or dispel their suspicions quickly, during
which time 1 it [is] necessary to detain the
defendant. " State Vt grpvier, 808 P.2d 133,
136 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (quoting United
States V, Sharps, 470 U.S. 675, 686, 84 L.
Ed. 2d 605, 105 S. Ct. 1568 (1985)).
Lopez. 873 P.2d at 1132.
u

[T]he trial court's final determination concerning

lawfulness of a detention or search is reviewed for correctness.
State v. White, 856 P.2d 656, 659 (Utah App. 1993).

The trial

court's ruling should not, however, be subjected to "a close de
novo review."

State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 939 (Utah 1994).

Rather, some deference is accorded the trial court because the
reasonable suspicion standard itself "conveys a measure of
discretion to the trial judge [s]" so that they can "grapple with
the multitude of fact patterns that may constitute a reasonablesuspicion determination."
B.

Id. at 939-40.

The Trial Court's Findings Concerning Continued
Detention Based on an Investigation of the Status

<?Z the Driver's Licemge »*id Level pf intpxig^tipn
were not Clearly Erroneous
Defendant's first challenge to the scope of her detention is
couched as a challenge to the trial court's findings.

She claims

that the trial court's assumption that Littlefield, the driver of
the car, did not have a valid driver's license and that Officer
McGiven's observation that Littlefield showed "signs of
intoxication" (R. 61), are unsupported by the record and,
therefore, inadequate to justify her continued detention.
Appellant's Br. at 5-6.

Defendant substantially misreads the

record.
In contrast to the constricted deference given to the trial

9

court's legal conclusions, its findings of purely factual issues
that underlie its reasonable suspicion determination, such as
witness credibility and historical facts, are subject to reversal
only if clearly erroneous,

Pena, 869 P.2d at 939 n.4.

Factual

determinations are clearly erroneous only if they conflict with
the clear weight of the evidence or if the reviewing court has a
definite and firm and definite conviction that a mistake has been
made.

State v. Hargraves. 806 P.2d 228, 231 (Utah App. 1991) .

All disputes in the evidence are resolved in a light most
favorable to the trial court's determination.

Pena. 869 P.2d at

936 (noting that the clearly erroneous standard is highly
deferential to the trial court, not only because the trial judge
in the best position to assess witness credibility, but also
because the judge is "in the best position . . . to derive a
sense of the proceedings as a whole, something an appellate court
cannot hope to garner from a cold record").

The Validity

of the Driver's

License

Officer McGiven testified that he asked Littlefield for
identification, that in response Littlefield gave his name and
date of birth, that he (the officer) ran a check on Littlefield's
license and that he was not sure whether the license was
suspended (R. 133). On cross-examination Officer McGiven
reiterated that he was not sure whether the license was valid,
but added, with respect to having checked the license even though
he apparently did not charge Littlefield with an offense related
to the license: "That particular charge was not one of my major
concerns at the time" (R. 137-38).

Additionally, the State

argued to the trial court (see Memorandum of Points and
Authorities in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Suppress,
10

hereinafter "State's memorandum," R. 38-47), that Littlefield
told Officer McGiven that he did not have his license with him
(R. 43).
The trial court made two separate findings regarding
Littlefield's license.

First, the court found that "Littlefield

told Sergeant McGiven that he did not have his driver's license
with him, so the officer ran a check on Littlefield for his
driver's license and for outstanding warrants" (Memorandum
Decision, hereinafter "Decision," R. 56-59, at 58, par. 3,
attached at Addendum B).

Second, the court found that

"Littlefield did not have a driver's license" (Decision, R. 57,
par. 9). In making its findings the trial court generally relied
on the parties' memoranda.4

At the hearing on the motion to

suppress, defendant did not challenge the State's assertion in
the State's memorandum that Littlefield had told Officer McGiven
that he did not have a license.
the assertion was accurate.

Thus, it is fair to assume that

Even considering just the motion to

suppress hearing, a fair reading of the record is that the
license was invalid because Officer McGiven appears to have
discovered a licensing violation, but that he was not very
concerned about it, considering that Littlefield had an
outstanding warrant and was evidently in violation of the "not a
drop" law.

On these facts, the court's finding cannot be said to

be clearly erroneous.
Even if the finding was erroneous, i.e., Littlefield was

4

One explicit instance of the court's reliance on the
parties' memoranda is its reference to defendant's memorandum in
support of defendant's motion to suppress (See Decision, R. 58,
par. 6).
11

found to possess a valid license, the ultimate status of the
license was irrelevant to the officer's detaining Littlefield to
determine the status of the license following a legitimate
traffic stop and to simultaneously run a warrants check, as
argued below.

Once the outstanding warrant was discovered, the

ensuing arrest justified a search the of the car.

Littlefield'8

Showing ""Signs of

Intoxication"

Officer McGiven testified that he smelled a slight odor of
alcohol on Littlefield's breath as he questioned him about his
identity (R. 132). The smell was much stronger when Littlefield
exited the car and got closer to the officer (R. 133). Defendant
neglects to mention that Officer McGiven then noticed "some other
symptoms that [the officer] was concerned about as well," to wit:
Littlefield's eyes appeared to be glazed, his pupils appeared to
be constricted and his speech was slow and thick.

These symptoms

were significant enough in Officer McGiven's mind to summon Wayne
Fish, an Alcohol Enforcement Officer, to the scene (R. 133, 140).
Officer Fish confirmed Officer McGiven's observation that
Littlefield's pupils were constricted.

Littlefield's horizontal

gaze nystagmus test also indicated the presence of alcohol in
Littlefield's blood (R. 168), the alcohol level of which later
tested at 0.035 percent (R. 170).
In support of its finding that Officer McGiven observed
"signs of intoxication," the trial court also found that "[w]hile
talking with defendant Littlefield,5 Sergeant McGiven observed
that Littlefield's eyes were glazed, his pupils appeared
5

Both defendant and Littlefield were arrested for
substantially similar offenses and both moved to suppress in the
same proceeding (Decision, R. 58-59).
12

abnormally constricted, and his speech was slow and thick"
(Decision, R. 58, par. 3). Based on the record, these findings
cannot be considered clearly erroneous, However, even if the
challenged finding was erroneous, it would not prejudice
defendant.

The signs Officer McGiven observed plainly justified

further detention to determine Littlefield's level of
intoxication for public safety reasons, as the trial court noted
(Decision, R. 57, par. 9). Further, considering that Officer
McGiven had determined at the outset that Littlefield was under
age, the mere smelling of alcohol on Littlefield's breath was
ground for arresting him on the "not a drop" law, justifying a
search incident to arrest on that ground.

Finally, as discussed

below, the smell of alcohol on Littlefield's breath gave probable
cause to believe that there was alcohol in the car, an
independent basis for arresting defendant for being a minor in
possession of alcohol.
C.

Defendant was not Unreasonably Detained by a

The trial court found that:
8. . . . Utah case law allow officers to run
a warrants check in connection with a traffic
stop "so long as it does not significantly
extend the period of detention beyond that
reasonably necessary to request a driver's
license and valid registration and to issue a
citation. . . .
9. In the present case, Sergeant McGiven
testified that he observed signs of
intoxication in defendant Littlefield and
that Littlefield did not have a driver's
license. Each of these circumstances provide
justification for he warrants check run by
Sergeant McGiven, and the question of whether
Littlefield was driving under the influence
of alcohol or a controlled substance would
necessitate extending the duration of the
13

traffic stop for purposes of ensuring public
safety. For these reasons, the Court finds
that Sergeant McGiven's actions in running a
warrants check on defendant Littlefield were
appropriate under the circumstances.
(Decision, R. 57).
Defendant challenges the trial court's ruling that Officer
McGiven properly detained her while he checked for warrants on
Littlefield, relying primarily on State v. Johnson, 805 P.2d 761
(Utah 1991).

In that case the defendant passenger and her

companion were stopped in a car having no registration and which
neither the driver nor passenger evidently owned.

Id. at 762.

Asking only for the occupants' identification, the officer
immediately ran a warrant's check to determine whether the car
was stolen, discovering the passenger had outstanding warrants
Id.

A search of the passenger's backpack incident to her arrest

produced drug paraphernalia and amphetamines.

Id.

The supreme

court reversed defendant's conviction, holding that the paucity
of facts available to the officer did not give rise to an
articulable suspicion of criminality justifying expanding the
scope of the detention to include a warrants check.

Id. at 764.

This case is dramatically different than Johnson.

First,

the detention to check for warrants against the defendant in
Johnson was unjustified because the officer had not yet asked
questions that might readily have abated his suspicions about
whether the car was stolen.

Id.

In this case, however, Officer

McGiven did not even run a warrants check against defendant.
Second, the warrants check against Littlefield was justified, not
only by his not having a license, but also because he was plainly
in violation of the "not a drop" law.
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Since Johnson. Utah's appellate courts have explicitly
stated that conducting a warrants check in connection with a
routine traffic stop is justified so long as it does not
significantly extend the period of detention.

State v. Robinson,

797 P.2d 431, 435 (Utah App. 1990); State Y, FiguerQfr-SQlfrrJQ,
830 P.2d 276, 280 (Utah App. 1992); State v. Bradford. 839 P.2d
866, 869 (Utah App. 1992) State v. Rochel. 850 P.2d 480, 482
(Utah App. 1993); Hiaains. 884 P.2d at 1245 n.2.
Distinguishing Johnson, the court in Lopez explained the
policy considerations justifying checking for warrants following
a routine traffic stop: "On one hand, the impact of a warrants
check on the scope of detention is minimal because 'computerized
data storage renders the time for a check negligible.' . . . On
the other hand, the governmental interest in arresting citizens
who have outstanding warrants is substantial.
1133 (citations omitted).

Lopez. 873 P.2d at

Therefore, if the officer can complete

the warrants check within the period of time necessary to
complete his duties incurred by the stop, then the "stop is
lawful because the check does 'not add to the delay already
lawfully experienced by the offender as a result of his
violation' and does 'not represent any further intrusion on his
rights.'"

Id. (citations omitted).

There is no allegation that the warrants check

unduly

prolonged defendant's detention while Officer McGiven checked
Littlefield's license, but rather that the detention simply
occurred.

Appellant's Br. at 7.

See Hiaains. 884 P.2d at 1245

n.2 (rejecting challenge to a detention involving a warrants
check, in part because there was no showing that the warrants
check significantly extended the period of time reasonably
15

necessary to run the driver's license check).

It would appear

from the record that Officer McGiven requested the warrants and
license check simultaneously and received the results very
shortly thereafter (R. 133). On this record, defendant has
failed to show that the trial court improperly concluded that the
warrants check was justified.
D.

Defendant Fails to Show that She was Unreasonably

Petfrinsd by a waiting tor Police Backup
Defendant also argues that she was unduly detained for
fifteen minutes while waiting for Officer Fish to respond to
Officer McGiven7s request for backup.

Appellant's Br. at 7.

However, defendant cites no authority nor genuinely argues that
such period is constitutionally impermissible, and the Court
-should therefore decline to consider the argument.

State v.

Mincy, 838 P.2d 648, 652 n.l (Utah App.) (refusing to consider
arguments unsupported by legal analysis or authority, citing
State v. Amicone, 689 P.2d 1341, 1344 (Utah 1984)), cert, denied.
843 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1992) . In any case, the claim fails to
recognize the real considerations in assessing a constitutionally
acceptable period of detention.
In State v. Grovier. this Court stated:
The United States Supreme Court has not
chosen to define a bright-line rule as to the
acceptable length of a detention because
"common sense and ordinary human experience
must govern over rigid criteria." United
States v. Sharpe.. 47Q U.S. 675, 685, 105 S.
Ct. 1568, 1575, 84 L.Ed.2d 605 (1985). The
Court has chosen to focus, not on the length
of the detention alone, but on "whether the
police diligently pursued a means of
investigation that was likely to confirm or
dispel their suspicions quickly, during which
time it was necessary to detain the
defendant." Id. at 686, 105 S.Ct. at 1575.
16

Grovier. 808 P.2d at 136 (findina reasonable a ninety minute
detention to first move a car to a safe place and then search it
to verify a reliable informant's tip that the defendant was
transporting narcotics) (citations omitted); Figueroa-SolflrJQ/
830 P.2d at 280 ("the length of a detention is not dispositive of
its reasonableness").
After Officer McGiven stopped the car, checked Littlefield's
license and for warrants and assessed again the signs of
Littlefield's probable intoxication, the officer called for
backup, all of which took about fifteen minutes (R. 133, 140).
Officer Fish was eight blocks away when he received the call, and
he responded immediately, arriving within five or ten minutes (R.
134, 161). Defendant fails to show that the time period
preceding Officer McGiven's request for backup or Officer Fish's
response time were unacceptable in the circumstances, or that in
requesting backup, Officer McGiven was not diligently pursuing a
means of investigation calculated to confirm his suspicions about
Littlefield's state of inebriation.

In sum, the Court should

find the trial court correctly concluded that the stop was
reasonably extended for purposes of ensuring public safety
(Decision, R. 57, par. 9).

E.

officer Mcgjveyi fr^a Rgagpufrfrie syigpicipfr tp Agk
Defendant about the Presence of Alcohol in the Car

Defendant finally argues that because Officer McGiven did
not smell alcohol or marijuana on defendant, or have any reason
to believe that defendant had violated the law or that there was
contraband in the car, his asking defendant whether there was any
alcohol in the car and the resulting search violated her Fourth
Amendment rights. Appellant's Br. at 7-8, 10.
17

In support,

defendant cites State v- qpflina-LWia/ 826 P. 2d 652 (Utah App.
1992) and State v. Zeigleman. 276 Utah Adv. Rep. 56 (Utah App.
1995) . Because defendant fails to adequately assess the facts
available to Officer McGiven when he approached defendant, his
argument is flawed and his authority inapposite.6
The reasonable suspicion test for making an investigative
stop is well-known: "where an officer observes unusual conduct
which reasonably leads him to conclude in light of his experience
that criminal activity may be afoot" a brief investigative stop
and detention to dispel the officerfs suspicion or prevent
criminal activity is justified.

Terry. 392 U.S. at 22, 30, 88 S.

Ct. at 1880, 1884-85 (emphasis added); State v. Beanr 869 P.2d
984, 986 (Utah App. 1994) (uan officer may seize a person if the
officer has an 'articulable suspicion' that the person has
committed or is about to commit a crime") (emphasis in
original) .7

6

The trial court did not make an express finding on the
reasonableness of Officer McGiven's question, probably because
the argument was only cursorily mentioned in defendant's
memorandum (R. 22) and not at all at the evidentiary hearing on
the motion to suppress. Such nominal reference is ground for
refusing to consider defendant's argument. State v. Dudley. 847
P.2d 424, 426 (Utah App. 1993) ("Mere allusion to state
constitutional claims, unsupported by meaningful analysis, does
not permit appellate review."). Even if the trial court
considered defendant's claim, but failed to make express
findings, the Court may assume that the lower court made the
requisite findings since the underlying record facts are in
accord with its decision. See Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1130 (finding
the necessary findings implicit in the trial court's other
findings and because consistent with its suppression order,
citing State v. Ramirez. 817 P.2d 774, 787-88 & n.6 (Utah 1991)).
7

The reasonable suspicion standard is also codified:
A peace officer may stop any person in a
public place when he has a reasonable
18

In evaluating the validity of an inver-.igative stop or
detention, a court must consider

fff

the totality of the

circumstances -- the whole picture.1"

United States v. Sokolow,

490 U.S. 1, 8, 109 S. Ct. 1581, 1585 (1989) (quoting United State
v. Cortez. 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981)).

&££ alSQ

State v»

Stricklina. 844 P.2d 979, 983 (Utah App. 1992).
In Ziegleman. this Court recognized that an investigating
officer's question about whether there were any weapons or
narcotics in the car "exceeded the scope of detention for a
routine traffic stop and bore no relation to the issue of whether
the vehicle was stolen, and thus the continued detention violated
the Fourth Amendment."

Ziegleman, 276 Utah Adv. Rep. at 57 n.l.

In Godina-Luna. this Court came to a similar conclusion where the
officer asked the defendants about the presence of firearms or
drugs after having satisfied himself that they were not driving
under the influence of alcohol, the basis for the stop. GodinaLuna,826 p.2d at 654-55.
Both Zeigleman and Godina-Luna illustrate, by contrast, the
valid basis for Officer McGiven's questioning defendant in this
case.

Officer McGiven suspected defendant was a minor even

before he spoke to her on the basis of her physical appearance,
and he confirmed that suspicion when he checked defendant's
license (R. 143). Further, he suspected that there might be
alcohol in the car after he first smelled it on Littlefield's
suspicion to believe he has committed or is
in the act of committing or is attempting to
commit a public offense and may demand his
name, address and an explanation of his
actions.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-15 (1995).
19

breath (R. 144). However, the officer only first questioned
defendant during or after the field sobriety tests on
Littlefield, when the driver's violation of the "not a drop" law,
applicable to minors, became even more evident (R. 156, 159).
Given Littlefield's obvious consumption of some alcohol,
still evident on his breath, it was reasonable for the officer to
believe that there might be alcohol in the car.

Cf. State v.

Naisbitt, 827 P.2d 969, 972 (Utah App. 1992) (finding reasonable,
as an exception to the warrant requirement, a vehicle search upon
detecting the odor of marijuana).

A minor violates Utah Code

Ann. § 32a-12-209 (1994) merely by being in possession of
alcohol, even if she has not consumed any.

Therefore, Officer

McGiven's failure to smell alcohol or marijuana about defendant's
person does not bear on his reasonably suspecting her of
violating that statute.

Given that the car belonged to

defendant,8 that she was a minor and that alcohol was probably in
the car, Officer McGiven had a reasonable, articulable suspicion
that defendant had violated the law, justifying his asking a
question that would either confirm or dispel his suspicions.
Indeed, by asking whether there was alcohol in the car, Officer
McGiven investigated his suspicions in precisely the way
recommended by the supreme court in Johnson, to wit: he proceeded
in the most minimally intrusive way to either confirm or dispel
his suspicions.

Johnson. 805 P.2d at 764.

In sum, the officer's

question to defendant was justified under the circumstances.

8

Defendant asserted in her motion to suppress that she was
the owner of the car, a fact not disputed on appeal (See
Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion to Suppress, R. 29
n.2) .
20

In response to Officer McGiven's question, defendant
produced five bottles of beer, thus establishing that she was a
minor in possession of alcohol and subject to arrest (R. 145).
On appeal defendant does not challenge that incident to a valid
arrest the officers would have authority to search the car,
relying on the strength of her preceding arguments.

However, the

search was plainly justified, being based not only on defendant's
arrest, but also on Littlefield's arrest for violating the "not a
drop" law and the outstanding warrant (R. 154). Therefore,
defendant's Fourth Amendment rights were not violated when the
officers searched the car and found a large quantity of
marijuana.
ORAL ARGUMENT NOT REQUESTED
Based on this Court's prior development of the issues raised
in this case, the State does not request oral argument.

CONCISION
Based on the foregoing discussion, the State respectfully
requests that defendant's convictions be affirmed.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

//

day of March, 1996.

JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General

KENNETH A. BRONSTON
Assistant Attorney General
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that two true and accurate copies of the
foregoing Brief of Appellee were mailed, postage prepaid, to
Michael D. Esplin, Aldrich, Nelson, Weight & Esplin, attorneys
for defendant, 43 East 200 North, P.O. Box n L", Provo, Utah
84603-0200, this )(

day of March, 1996.
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ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A

UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, AMENDMENT IV
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not
be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.
Utah Code Ann. 32a-12-209 (1994)
(1) It is unlawful for any person under the
age of 21 years to purchase, possess, or
consume any alcoholic beverage or product,
unless specifically authorized by this title.
Utah Code Ann. 41-6-44.4 (1993)
(2) (a) A person younger than 21 years of
age may not operate or be in actual physical
control of a vehicle with any measurable
blood, breath, or urine alcohol concentration
in his body as shown by a chemical test.
Utah Code Ann. 77-7-15 (1995)
A peace officer may stop any person in a
public place when he has a reasonable
suspicion to believe he has committed or is
in the act of committing or is attempting to
commit a public offense and may demand his
name, address and an explanation of his
actions.

ADDENDUM B

-- H " ^ Judica- District Court
o I -dinCountv,Stateof Utah

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 941400179
CASE NO. 941400180

vs.

DATE January 9, 1995

RICHARD DAMON JJTTLEFIELD,
CATRINA MARIE OTTENSON,
Defendants.

BOYD L. PARK, JUDGE

This matter is before the Court on Defendants' Motion to Suppress, filed on July 6,
1994, and a suppression hearing held September 26, 1994. At the suppression hearing, Utah
County Attorney James R. Taylor appeared for and on behalf of the State of Utah.
Defendant Richard Damon Littlefield was present with his attorney Shelden R. Carter, and
defendant Catrina Maria Ottenson was present with her attorney Michael Esplin. Officers
Gary McGiven and Wayne Fish were sworn and testified before the Court. Defendants were
given ten days to submit supplemental memoranda to the Court and Mr. Taylor was given
five days to respond. On October 7, 1994, the State filed a Request For Ruling based upon
the briefs and arguments already presented, since neither defendant submitted supplemental
memoranda during the ten days specified by the Court.
The Court, having received and reviewed the motion, memorandum in support,
memorandum in opposition, and the applicable law, and having heard testimony and oral
arguments, now makes the following findings and conclusions:
1.

On January 6, 1994, defendants were arrested for (a) being minors in possession of

alcohol; (b) for possession of marijuana with intent to distribute; (c) for possession of drug
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paraphernalia; and (d) for violating the Illegal Drug Tax Stamp Act. Defendant Littlefield
was also arrested on an outstanding warrant for failure to appear on a traffic violation.
2.

The arrests were made subsequent to a traffic stop made by Sergeant McGiven of

the Orem Department of Public Safety. Defendant Littlefield was driving defendant
Ottenson's car, in which Ottenson was a passenger, when Sergeant McGiven stopped
Littlefield for following the officer's vehicle too closely.
3.

While talking with defendant Littlefield, Sergeant McGiven observed that

Littlefield's eyes were glazed, his pupils appeared abnormally constricted, and his speech
was slow and thick. Littlefield told Sergeant McGiven that he did not have his driver's
license with him, so the officer ran a check on Littlefield for his driver's license and for
outstanding warrants. Upon being advised that there was an outstanding warrant on
Littlefield for failure to appear on a traffic violation, Sergeant McGiven asked Littlefield to
step out of the car. As Littlefield complied, Sergeant McGiven noticed the smell of alcohol.
Because Sergeant McGiven was not on duty, he requested assistance from Officer Wayne
Fish, who conducted sobriety tests on Defendant Littlefield.
4.

Defendant Ottenson surrendered a carton of beer to Sergeant McGiven. Sergeant

McGiven placed Ottenson and Littlefield under arrest for being minors in possession of
alcohol, and Sergeant McGiven conducted a search of the whole car incident to the arrests.
5.

During the search of the car, Sergeant McGiven found drug paraphernalia and

marijuana, some of which appeared to be packaged for resale. Both defendants were then
placed under arrest for possession of marijuana and intent to distribute within a drug-free
zone.
6.

The Memorandum In Support Of Defendants' Motion To Suppress alleges that

defendants were arrested 18 minutes after the car was searched, and that the search was
therefore not made incident to a lawful arrest. However, evidence presented indicates that
both defendants were arrested on the charge of possession of alcohol by minors and that
Memorandum Decision 941400179, 941400180
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defendant Littlefield was arrested on the outstanding warrant, and that the search of the car
was lawfully made incident to these arrests. The arrests for possession of marijuana with
intent to distribute, possession of drug paraphernalia, and violation of the Illegal Drug Tax
Stamp Act were then made at the conclusion of the search of the car.
8.

Defendants also argue that the warrants check was unjustified and therefore

improper. Defendants cite State v Johnson T 805 P.2d 761 (Utah 1991), in support of their
position. In that case, the Utah Supreme Court ruled that running a warrants check arguably
exceeds the reasonable scope of the traffic stop when the officer has no reasonable suspicion
of criminal activity beyond the traffic offense itself. However, Utah case law allows officers
to run a warrants check in connection with a traffic stop "so long as it does not significantly
extend the period of detention beyond that reasonably necessary to request a driver's license
and valid registration and to issue a citation." See State v. Lopez. 873 P.2d 1127 (Utah
1994). See also State v. Figueroa-Solorio. 830 P.2d 276 (Utah App. 1992); State v.
Chapman. 841 P.2d 725 (Utah App. 1992), cert, granted. 857 P.2d 948 (Utah 1993).
9.

In the present case, Sergeant McGiven testified that he observed signs of

intoxication in defendant Littlefield and that Littlefield did not have a driver's license. Each
of these circumstances provide justification for the warrants check run by Sergeant McGiven,
and the question of whether Littlefield was driving under the influence of alcohol or a
controlled substance would necessitate extending the duration of the traffic stop for purposes
of ensuring public safety. For these reasons, the Court finds that Sergeant McGiven's
actions in running a warrants check on defendant Littlefield were appropriate under the
circumstances.
10.

Defendants also cite Utah case law holding it impermissible for police to use a

misdemeanor arrest as an excuse to search for evidence of a more serious crime. See State
v. Sierra. 754 P.2d 972 (Utah App. 1988), overruled in part on other grounds: State v.
Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684 (Utah 1990). Defendants argue that since penalties for the crime of
Memorandum Decision 941400179, 941400180
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possession of alcohol by a minor are not affected by the quantity of alcohol involved, and
since defendant Ottenson had voluntarily surrendered a carton of beer, Sergeant McGiven
had no need to search the car in an attempt to find more alcohol. Defendants maintain that
the officers' search of the car was therefore made solely to seek evidence of a more serious
crime.
11.

The State cites the U.S. Supreme Court case of California v. Acevedo. 500 U.S.

565 (1991) as specifically authorizing the search of a defendant's automobile, based upon an
arrest made when an officer has probable cause to believe the defendant committed an
offense. The State also argues that the evidence located in defendant's car was also properly
obtained during an inventory of the vehicle conducted in accordance with established
inventory procedures of the Utah County Sheriffs Office. See South Dakota v. Opperman,
428 U.S. 364 (1976); Carroll v. United States. 267 U.S. 132 (1925); and State v. Earl. 716
P.2d 803 (Utah 1986) (holding that a search of defendant's automobile trunk was proper
under the ruling of Carroll).
12.

Based on the above findings of fact and conclusions of law, the Court hereby denies

defendants' Motion To Suppress Evidence.
Counsel for the State is to prepare an order within 15 days of this decision
consistent with the terms of this decision and submit it to opposing counsel i^Mfiproval as to
form prior to submission to the Court for signature.
Dated at Provo, Utah this 9th day of January, 1995.
COUR1

BOYD L.PAJaC JUDGE ';
cc:

Utah County Attorney
Michael D. Esplin
Shelden R. Carter
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